The President’s Message:
The first meeting of the Civil war Round
Table of the Palm Beaches officially was held on September 16, 1987.
The attendance sheet listed
Robert Godwin, Rodney Dillon, Dr. Joel Gordon, and Greg Parkinson.
Robert Godwin fulfilled his dream
of gathering together like individuals who wanted to discuss and study
the Civil War. I hope that Bob
Godwin is looking down at us and pleased that the Round Table will be
celebrating our twenty-ninth anniversary.
The Round Table meeting is canceled for Wednesday,
October
12, 2016.
This year Yom Kippur falls on the day of the Round Table meeting in
October. A suitable,
alternative date was not available at the Scottish Rite Hall.
Robert Krasner will be speaking
in November.
A very special thank you goes to the officers
and members who have served the Round Table through the years.
Your continued support helps to
make the Club even stronger.
Anyone who volunteers, even for the smallest task, adds to the success
of our organization. Your efforts
are always appreciated.
We will have some special books in the
raffle. The refreshments will be
cakes baked from Civil War recipes, one from the North and one from the
South.
Happy Anniversary, Round Table!
Gerridine LaRovere
September 14, 2016 Program:
The Round Table meeting on September 14, 2016
will be a panel discussion of what was going on in the world from 1845 -
1870. The panel will be made up of our members with each one
giving a 10 -15 summary of a particular country. Countries to
include Spain, England, Germany, Mexico, China, Russia, and France.
August 10, 2016 Program:
 William
McEachern spoke on the topic
Robert E. Lee's Real
Plan at Gettysburg.
What was Robert E. Lee’s Plan for Gettysburg on July 3, 1863?
To answer this question, one has to try to ascertain what was in
the mind of Robert E. Lee during the three days of July of 1863.
How can one do this?
We shall review the Official Reports written by Lee himself, as well as
any other writings that Lee made dealing with this issue.
We shall review the battle itself to see if such a review can
provide clues as to what Lee’s real plan was.
This will entail reviewing maps of the battle on all three days.
Next, we shall review letters, diaries, and reports of
Confederate officers who reported what they were told by Lee and what
they told Lee. Finally, we
shall review what Union officers and soldiers wrote about the battle.
The traditional approach to Lee’s
plan may be summarized as follows: Lee tried the Union right flank on
the 1st, the Union right and left flanks on
the 2nd, and the Union center on the 3rd.
This analysis overlooks the fact that Robert E. Lee said that the
plan was unchanged from the 2nd to the 3rd.
How can an attack on the center be the same as an attack on the
left flank?
The traditional approach to Lee’s
plan basically holds that Lee took an opportunistic approach.
Lee’s Army stumbled into the Union Army on July 1, 1863.
Lee ordered Ewell to assault Cemetery Ridge, because it was their
and it was the logical follow-up to what had already happened in July 1st.
On July 2nd, 1863, Lee tried attacking the
other flank, as well as trying to attack the northern flank of the Union
army. On July 3rd, 1863, Lee attacked the center,
because, having tried both flanks, Lee thought the center must be weak.
The traditional analysis puts a
great deal of emphasis upon Little Round Top on the 2nd.
Thus, the traditional analysis argues that Lee recognized Little
Round Top as being the key geographical position and, therefore, had
Longstreet make his assault against it.
For the traditional analysis to be
correct, Lee’s official reports would have to have mentioned Little
Round Top in some way.
Unfortunately, Lee does not mention Little Round Top by name or in any
other way in any of his three reports.
On the other hand, Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery Hill figure quite
largely in Lee’s reports.
How can the traditional analysis be correct, if Lee does not recognize
Little Round Top as being the key?
Did Lee’s plan change?
Lee certainly did not think so.
Lee issued two Official Reports of the battle.
In each of these Official Reports, Lee wrote that his plan was
unchanged from the 2nd to the 3rd.
On July 31, 1863, Robert E. Lee wrote his first official report
concerning the Battle of Gettysburg.
Lee wrote: “These
partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day (NB:
the 3rd).
Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet for the
following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the positions
gained by him the day before.
The general plan of
attack was unchanged
excepting that one division and two
brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet.”
Further, months later, Lee forwarded
to Richmond his Official Report of the Battle of Gettysburg, dated
January __, 1864: “The result of this day's operations (NB: July 2nd, 1863)
induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the
increased support that the positions gained on the (NB Confederate)
right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we
should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue
the attack.
The general plan was unchanged.
Of particular note is the fact that
Lee not only said on July 31, 1863 that the plan was unchanged, but also
he reiterated that statement six months later in the January __, 1864
Report. If Lee changed the
plan from a flank attack on the left on July 2nd 1863 to an attack on the center on
July 3rd, 1863, why didn’t he say so?
He certainly had plenty of time to think over his statement in
the intervening six months.
The fact that he did not do so emphasizes that fact that the plan was
the same. So, we have to
look under the hood and see what the point of the attacks on each day of
July were to see what the real plan was.
A superficial analysis will not suffice.
What was his plan, then?
The plan had at least four elements: 1) attack a salient; 2)
concentration of a large portion of Confederate forces upon a small
portion of the Union forces; 3) concentration at the commanding
geographical position held by the Union forces; and 4) gaining that
geographical position to destroy the Union Army and win the ‘war in a
day’.
I believe that Lee’s Plan was always
to assail the Union Army on Cemetery Hill and Ridge.
What supports this analysis?
On July 2nd, Lee wanted to take a certain
commanding position on the Union left.
“In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from
which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used
to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus
enable us to reach the crest of the ridge.
That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position…”
This position is the Peach Orchard.
We know this because Porter Alexander identified it as such for
us.
“The enemy occupied a strong
position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each
other, one southeast, and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately
south of the town, which lay at its base.”
Interestingly enough, Cemetery Hill is the only terrain feature,
other than the Emmitsburg Road, which is mentioned in the Official
Reports of Ewell, Hill, and Longstreet.
Lee mentions the features of Cemetery Ridge and the Emmitsburg
Road. Note that he does not
mention Little Round Top by name and does not think it important.
If Little Round Top were the position that Lee sought to gain as
the most important position to defeat the Union Army, why doesn’t is
figure into his Official Reports.
Why Would Lee Target Cemetery Hill?
First, the road network converges at the north edge of Cemetery
Hill. Second, the height of
Cemetery Hill is only a few feet shorter than Culps Hill; it is taller
than Brenner’s Hill; it is much higher than Cemetery Ridge.
It was far clearer of trees and shrubbery in 1863, so it made an
ideal gun platform in all directions.
Third, on the other hand, it was, in essence, a salient, which is
a militarily weak position.
Fourth, it was the position to which the Union Army had fled on July 1,
1863. Fifth, the Union Army
holding Cemetery Hill threatened Lee’s ability to move forces around
from Seminary Ridge to east
of Cemetery Hill.
On July 1st, at around 5:00pm, Longstreet
reported that he found Lee on Seminary Ridge watching the enemy retreat
to Cemetery Hill. Longstreet
wrote, “He [Lee] pointed out their position to me.”
This is when Longstreet discussed with Lee Longstreet’s plan to
shift the battle south and to march around the Union’s left flank.
After Longstreet presented his plan, Lee disagreed, “No, the
enemy is there, and I am going to attack him there.”
At that time, while the Union retreat was going on, the only
place to which the word ‘there’ could apply was Cemetery Hill, because
it was the only position the Union occupied.
On the evening of July 1st, Lee met with Generals Ewell,
Early, and Rodes. During
this meeting Lee discussed the possibility of a direct, frontal assault
upon Cemetery Hill. Ewell
demurred saying, “Cemetery Hill and the rugged hills on the left of
it…would inevitably be [taken only] at very great loss.”
In response to this, Lee suggested then that Ewell’s corps be
brought to the west. Ewell
responded negatively to this suggestion and replied that Cemetery Hill
could be taken “…as soon as Longstreet had broken the lines of the
Federal left.” Ewell argued
that Cemetery Hill was assailable from the Confederate right.
To answer why Lee attacked July 2,
1863, we need to know more about what Lee knew at the time of planning
the attack. The first
question then is what reconnaissance was done.
At about 4:00 am on July 2nd, 1863, Lee sent Captain Samuel R.
Johnston, a topographical engineer of Lee’s staff, out on a
reconnaissance mission to investigate the Union left flank.
While there is uncertainty of how far east Captain Johnston got,
there is no doubt that he reached the Peach Orchard.
What Captain Johnson told Lee, whether it was accurate or not is
not the issue, is that there were no Union forces in the Peach Orchard,
or on Houck’s Ridge, Big Round Top, and Little Round Top.
Thus, Lee formulated his plans in the belief that there were
Union forces south of some point on Cemetery Ridge, as he and his
generals had observed the previous evening.
Here is what Lee
ordered: Longstreet was
ordered to take the ground to his front in order to gain an artillery
position, i.e. the Peach Orchard.
It is clear that Little Round Top was not part of the plan.
Under this order, Hill is to threaten the enemy’s center and to
cooperate with Longstreet’s attack.
If Longstreet was ordered to attack Little Round Top, then
Longstreet would be marching east away from Hill and, thereby,
stretching Hill further and further from the Union center.
In a letter to Longstreet written after the war, Hood wrote that
Longstreet ordered Hood three times to attack “… up the Emmitsburg
Road.” Going up the
Emmitsburg Road
does not go to Little Round Top, but
rather goes northeast towards Cemetery Hill.
 Ewell
was ordered to take Cemetery Hill, the high ground on the Union right.
He was further instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration
upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should
opportunity offer.
First major conclusion:
Lee’s plan for July 2, 1863 was not to attack Little Round Top,
but to find a way to attack Cemetery Hill.
Longstreet’s attack was to gain the Peach Orchard to be used as a
gun platform. Little Round
Top could not be that gun platform, for while it was de-forested on the
western side, it was not deforested on the north side.
Thus, artillery on Little Round Top could not bear down the axis
of the Union line stretching north.
Further, Little Round Top was so rugged that very few guns could
be brought to its summit.
So, even if Little Round Top were gained, it was not a very good gun
platform for what Lee wanted to do.
The Peach orchard on the other hand had room enough for multiple
batteries and did allow for firing in a converging fire manner upon
Cemetery Hill.
In my opinion, Lee was trying on
July 2nd, 1863 to replicate what he had done
time and time again: a division of his army in the face of the enemy
combined with a march to hit a flank of the enemy with the aim of
re-concentrating at the point of military importance.
Lee had used this tactic most recently at Chancellorsville.
On Lee’s right he ordered Longstreet and Hill to utilize an “en
echelon” attack against the Union forces.
This one at a time attack along a diagonal had Hood’s brigades
going in first, followed by McLaws, and the Anderson.
It was very successful.
Of particular note was McLaws’ division of Longstreet’s corps
attack in the late afternoon on at least two sides of the Peach Orchard.
All Union resistance there collapsed.
At this time, Longstreet ordered Porter Alexander to bring
forward a full battalion of artillery-six batteries-to the Peach Orchard
as this was the plan to shell Union positions.
The entire Union left was caving in.
Humphreys, the Union officer in charge of this sector, looked at
his three disintegrating brigades and the entire Union line that was
evaporating under the Confederate charge and later wrote.
“For the moment, I thought the day was lost.”
Barksdale, obeying his original orders, wheeled his troops
northeast, parallel to the Emmitsburg Road, and ordered them to charge.
The 1st Minnesota held the Union line at a terrible cost.
Barksdale himself was killed at the apex of his advance.
Darkness, as well as Confederate exhaustion, finally ended the
day’s fight as the shaken, depleted Federal units on their heights took
stock. They had barely held
on against the full ferocity of the Rebels, on a day that decided the
fate of the nation.
 The
situation was so crucial atop Cemetery Hill, that Major General Winfield
S. Hancock personally ordered Randall of the 13th Vermont to save the guns.
Randall answered Hancock’s plea to retake the guns with, “I can
and damn quick too, if you will let me.”
It is important to note that Hancock said that had he not ordered
this suicided attack, then the day “would have been lost’, not the day
“could have been lost.”
Note the timing of the Cemetery Hill
attacks on July 2nd, 1863.
Long after the attacks on Cemetery Ridge ended, Ewell gets his
troops into action. The same
troops that had just defended the Ridge make it back in time to defend
the Hill.
Just as twilight
was bringing an end to the fighting on the Union left, Confederate Gen.
Richard S. Ewell's assault on the opposite flank was about to commence.
A half an hour before sunset, the division of Gen. Edward
"Allegheny" Johnson began its long charge up the steep slopes of Culp's
Hill. Opposing Johnson's
4,700 Confederates, roughly 1,600 New Yorkers under Gen. George Sears
Greene were charged with holding the extreme right flank of the Union
Army and protecting its supply line, the Baltimore Pike.
Under the light of a full moon, Johnson's men made their assault,
only to run headlong into formidable breastworks erected by Greene's
troops. Gen. Maryland
Steuart's brigade managed to outflank the Yankees, who merely fell back
to another line or breastworks.
Increasing darkness led to great confusion as both sides tried to
blindly feed reinforcements into the fight.
The battle for Culp's Hill would resume at daylight.
In Lee’s two official
reports, Lee talks of the successes on July 2nd as a reason to go
forward on July 3rd.
In particular, Lee cites the capture of commanding position on
July 2nd as inducement to go
forward on July 3rd.
“…and with the
increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable
the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed…”
Stuart arrived at Gettysburg at
between noon and 1:00pm on the 2nd and immediately reported to Lee.
On the afternoon of July 2, 1863, Stuart rode off with a small
cadre of horseman when he heard the firefight between Fitz Lee’s
troopers and the 10th NY on Brinkerhoff Ridge.
Several commentators have stated that Lee gave no orders to
Stuart for July 3, 1863.
This statement is patently contradicted by Stuart’s official Report.
Lee wanted Stuart to guard Ewell’s left flank and attack the
Union rear when Ewell’s advance was successful.
 Although
Stuart wrote that he intended to effect a surprise upon the Union Army,
this surprise was not affected.
“I moved this command and W. H. F. Lee's secretly through the
woods to a position, and hoped to effect a surprise upon the enemy's
rear, but Hampton's and Fitz.
Lee's brigades, which had been ordered to follow me,
unfortunately debouched into the open ground, disclosing the movement,
and causing a corresponding movement of a large force of the enemy's
cavalry.” Stuart’s Official
Report blames Hampton and Fitz Lee for spoiling the surprise.
Yet two things undermined this assertion.
First, Stuart did not disguise his movement, because it was seen
by Howard’s XI Corps of Cemetery Hill.
This movement alerted Pleasanton, who may have in turn alerted
Gregg according to Gregg’s Official Report, which has to be called into
question, because he barely mentions Custer and seems to say that all
the casualties on the 3rd came from his troopers, when in fact 86% of the casualties came from
Custer’s men. In addition,
when Stuart reached Cress Ridge at around noon, he had his artillery
unlimber and then it fired either 2 shots or four, depending upon the
source, for reasons unstated.
Did Stuart ruin his own surprise?
Stuart was in the right place at the right time, if the
Confederates achieved a break through on Cemetery Ridge to isolate and
destroy Cemetery Hill.
On July 3rd, Stuart and his men engaged in a
bloody battle with Union cavalry forces.
General George A. Custer of David Gregg’s command fought at what
has become known as East Cavalry Field.
The battle began with a cavalry charge from the Confederate
forces, which was countered by the 7th Michigan.
The two forces engaged in intense point-blank fighting along the
fences of Rummel Farm. In
effort to turn the tides in his favor, Stuart sent a second charge led
by Wade Hampton, during which Hampton received multiple slashes to his
face at the hands of Union sabers.
Eventually, Union forces were able to surround the Confederates
on three sides, forcing Stuart to withdraw due in no small measure to
the Spencer repeating rifle.
But the Union men were in no condition to pursue them further as they
were still outnumbered. The
withdrawal at East Cavalry Field brought an end to Stuart’s troubled
ride to Gettysburg.
This was certainly Custer’s finest
hour. He had been ordered to
leave this area, but he recognized its importance.
He stayed behind, disobeying orders, until he met Gregg and
convinced him it was necessary that he, Custer, should remain.
During the battle, Custer charge superior numbers of Confederates
and drove them back.
This takes us to the fateful day of
July 3, 1863. Lee believes,
as I have explained, that he was successful on the 2nd.
The plan continued to be to take Cemetery Hill.
His failure on the 3rd was due to a number of factors.
First, there was a lack of co-operation and concentration of
forces. Next was Ewell being
taken out of equation by spoiler attack by Union on morning of July 3rd.
This was followed by Custer’s victory over Stuart.
There was no 2nd wave not supporting Pickett’s
Charge. And finally, the
artillery did not support Pickett’s flanks nor did it take out the Union
artillery. General George
Pickett had a few choice words for the day:
“The Yankees had something to do with it.”
Last changed: 08/24/16
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