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Volume 23, No. 3 – March 2010
Marshall D. Krolick, a long-time member of the
Roundtable here and in
Chicago, will discuss “The Boy Generals: The promotions of Custer,
Farnsworth and Merritt. On
June 28, 1863, George G. Meade was appointed to the command of the Army
of the Potomac. That same
day, Meade asked and obtained the immediate promotion of George A.
Custer, Elon J. Farnsworth and Wesley Merritt to the rank of brigadier
general of volunteers. That
two captains (Farnsworth and Merritt) and a first lieutenant (Custer),
each under thirty years of age, would be promoted to brigadier general
over the heads of other, more senior, officers is most unusual.
Each was assigned to the command of a brigade in the Cavalry
Corps of the Army of the Potomac, then commanded by Major General Alfred
Pleasanton. What makes this
chain of events even more remarkable is that the Federal cavalry was
then playing a vital role in the critical days of the Gettysburg
campaign, as the Union Army groped for the units of the Army of Northern
Virginia. Krolick will
analyze the cast of characters involved and detail the previously
ignored reasons behind these unusual promotions.
His final remarks will review the fate which awaited each of the
“boy generals” after their unprecedented promotions. Krolick, a native Chicagoan, received a BA degree
from Drake University in 1959 and a JD degree from Northwestern
University School of Law in 1962.
He is of counsel to the Chicago law firm of Deutsch, Levy &
Engel, Chtd., and resides in Weston, Florida and Northbrook, Illinois.
In the practice of law, Krolick specializes in commercial and
industrial real estate and the legal aspects of construction projects.
He has been a member of the Civil War Roundtable of Chicago since
1961, serving that organization in several capacities, including its
President (1971-72) and Editor of the Newsletter (1974-79).
In 1985, he was awarded Honorary Life Membership in that
Roundtable and in 1990 he received its Nevins-Freeman Award for
distinguished scholarship and dedication to Civil War studies.
He speaks regularly on Civil War topics to schools and civic
organizations and symposiums around the country and has served as a
guide on tours of Gettysburg and other battlefields.
He is the author of multiple articles that have appeared in
numerous publications, including a regular column in Civil War Times
Illustrated. Also, Ed Lewis will present a book review of
The American Civil War, by
John Keegan, a noted English author. President’s Message PLEASE REMEMBER: YOUR RECEIPT OF THE NEWSLETTER WILL STOP WITH THE APRIL 2010 ISSUE UNLESS YOUR DUES ARE CURRENT ($25 INDIVIDUAL, $30 FAMILY – A BARGAIN!) February 10, 2010 Meeting, Election of Officers, Other Business Your Editor blushes for his inadequate reporting of the election! In addition to electing Gerridine LaRovere as President, Robert Krasner as our Treasurer and Stephen Seftenberg as our Secretary, we also elected Herbert “Bud” Filer as Vice President, the following members were reelected as Directors: Monroe Ackerman, Morris Ball, Janell Bloodworth, Edwin Lewis and Marsha Sonnenblick. Janell is also Chair of Special Projects. The Roundtable’s future depends upon both “old blood” and “new blood.” Participation, the lifeblood of the Roundtable, is not only NOT onerous but can be lots of fun! If you are interested in chairing a committee, speaking, helping out with our “foraging,” speak to me or Janell at a meeting. Future Programs
We
are fortunate indeed to have a full schedule through August!
Our April speaker will be Edward H. Bonekemper, III (author
of books on Grant, McClellan and Lee), topic to be announced; our
May speaker will be William D. McEachern, topic to be announced; our
June speaker will be Janell Bloodworth on Clara Barton; our July
speaker will be Dr. George Nimberg describing the fantastic
collection of Civil War miniatures he has made; and our August
speaker will be Morris Ackerman on the Civil War in the West.
Jane Demchak Remembered On a sad note, the President advised the members that a veteran member, Jane Demchak, has died. Jane, a nurse, gave an interesting talk on nursing in the Civil War. Unfortunately, no one seems to know the names or address of her kin. This month’s Newsletter will be sent to Jane’s old address in hopes it will be forwarded to her Personal Representative or relatives, who will get in touch with the Roundtable. Also, those who wish to make a contribution to Battlefield Preservation in her name can send a check to Stephen L. Seftenberg, 2765 White Wing Lane, West Palm Beach, FL 33409, or give it to him at the March meeting.
February 10, 2010 Program Bob began his presentation with a question that had
bothered him for many years:
If the North dropped much of its
equipment on the battlefield early in the war, how did they appear a few
weeks or months later in complete “kit?” (This will be called “Bob’s
Question”) He promised
not to bore us with statistics but also promised to be factual!
He began with a short summary of his background and why it
qualified him to make this presentation:
His college major was Economics; he spent two years in the US
Army Transportation Corp where he taught career army officers about
computers and how they relate to logistics; For a dozen years he built
computer models of industrial distribution systems for Fortune 500
companies. He also referred
us to a number of relevant books:
Second Only to Grant,
Quartermaster General Montgomery C. Meigs, by David W. Miller;
The Supply for Tomorrow Must Not
Fail, by Lenette S. Taylor; and
The Business of Civil War, by
Mark R. Wilson.
He then turned to the first answer to his question: On the eve of Bull Run the “hot” war had been going on since the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12th. Even before that the South had taken over military supplies at forts, arsenals, and federal installations of all varieties. One of the biggest problems for the Union was the fact that with a larger standing army and a horde of supplies the Confederates were in better shape to fight than was the Union in the late spring of 1861. Of particular note is the action of Secretary of War John Floyd who single-handily transferred tons of supplies either into southern hands or placed them in a position where they could easily be seized. Picture if you will the ordnance depot at San Antonio. This was an immense collection of arms and ammunition that dropped like ripe fruit into the rebel basket. This story was repeated time and time again such that the Confederate States picked up more supplies just by walking in on government installations than from any battlefield loot or raiding party booty. Next came nine examples of southern materiel gains from the military stockpile of the north following Southern victories. As Bob has already suggested, premise of his question was in error. Each of these vignettes will end the same way. None of them materially affected the war’s outcome.
The year 1862 brings us to our next famous
logistical disaster:
Nathaniel “Commissary” Banks. This political general was beaten up badly
by Stonewall Jackson during the spring of 1862. He lost so much materiel
to the Confederates that he was given the nickname
Jackson’s Commissary. This is
really a deserved title as the story of the Shenandoah Valley campaign
is one embarrassment after another. After the battle of Winchester Maj.
John A. Harmon, CSA Quartermaster, reported: “In response to your
inquiry in regard to the order of quartermaster's stores that came into
my hands at Winchester, June 1 last, I beg leave to report that, upon a
careful estimate, they amounted to $125,185.” How much would that be
worth in today’s dollars? Here we have to be careful because an 1862
dollar for wages is worth about $160.00 today. However, an 1862 dollar
for physical goods is worth only about $25.00 today. Given that, Maj.
Harmon’s booty is worth over 3 million dollars! And this was just the
haul from the battle of Winchester. But before we get all lathered up about the economic disaster Banks represents, hark back to Mill Springs, Kentucky, where the South “delivered” 10 cannon, 100 wagons, over 1,000 horses, and a number of boats filled with the goods of war. The going price for a horse was about $120.00 in 1862, so just the 1,000 horses were worth $120,000.00 in 1862 dollars or 3 million dollars today for the horses alone. So perhaps the North should have referred to the unfortunate General Felix Zollicoffer as Thomas’s Commissary. Further, as we shall soon see, by this time in the war, the North is really starting to rev up its economic engine. We are forced to conclude that the United States could afford Nathaniel Banks in a way that the Confederate States could not. What about the debacle on the Peninsula?
Surely Bobby Lee and JEB Stuart picked General McClellan’s pocket
clean in that campaign. When he began to formulate his question, Bob
placed the Peninsula Campaign was right up there with Bull Run.
Certainly the material buildup to this expedition was massive.
Besides the roughly 100,000 men in McClellan’s force, it took a
staggering amount of materiel to support this army. A force of this size
“ate up” 150 wagon loads of supplies per day.
This is not battle losses. A
campaigning army could use up three times this amount. Even if the men
sat on their rumps, as they often did during this adventure, they
consumed the one to two tons each of these wagons. Picture this: If
those 150 wagons held an average of 1½ tons we are talking about 225
tons today, tomorrow, and on and on for the days between mid March and
the end of July 1862. These
numbers would not have been so bad if McClellan had actually done what
he said he could do. If he had taken Richmond and if that had really
ended the war, all would be forgiven, but of course he did not.
The
first major resupply point, after the initial landing at Ft. Monroe,
was at White House Landing on the north shore of the peninsula at
the confluence of the York and the Pamunkey rivers. This was chosen
because there was a railroad bridge that crossed the river and that
line lead directly to Richmond. After defeats by Lee, McClellan’s
army retreated, or as he put it “changed its base of operations” to
ports on the James River. Notable of these was Harrison’s Landing.
It was fortunate that Lee did not attack or destroy the beachhead,
but Lee was not in any great shape for an attack as he had taken the
worst of the battle losses.
So, what did this campaign cost the North beyond the 15,849
casualties? Not as much as you may think. From the start of the
build-up in mid-March until the final withdrawal in mid-August 1862,
I could locate very little abandonment of equipment. Of course the
battles took their toll of equipment beyond the obvious loss of
life, but the South took it on the chin even more than the Union
did.
Bob stated that he could find only one reference to the purposeful destruction of materiel on the part of the North. When they were moving their base of supply from the depots on the York River to supply points on the James River they did burn some foodstuffs. However, and this is important, massive amounts of supplies were successfully transferred before the burning. Over 800,000 rations were saved in this manner. Col. Clarke, the officer in charge of the subsistence removal reported: “I still need information about materiel. No Union troops went hungry due to the above removal of food.” Bob could not find any data on materiel lost. However, if there had been massive losses, it would have become common knowledge. By August 11th the retreat had begun and by August
21st it was over. You will be surprised to learn that much of the
supplies and many of the men simply marched southeasterly down the
Peninsula to Newport News and Fort Monroe. The number of ship
evacuations from Harrison’s Landing was limited. As a result, most of
the equipment went with the troops.
Naturally, much of the over 86,000 tons of supplies that went
down the Potomac at the start of the campaign never came back. These
tons however were consumed in use or were employed on the battlefield.
So, we must conclude, that the Peninsula campaign was neither a
tactical loss nor a supply disaster. If someone other than McClellan
were in charge, the outcome might have been different. This “what if”
remains a point of discussion even to this very day. The next five supply stories will not go into as
much detail as the preceding four. All nine examples have the same
conclusion: Bob’s Question
really was based on a false premise.
The North never really dropped significant equipment on the field
of battle. They did, however, lose much materiel in raids before and
after battles. At the same time that the Peninsula campaign was winding down the two sides fought another engagement at Manassas Junction known as Second Bull Run. While it looked like a Northern victory at the start, once again the South carried the day. But the boys in Blue retreated back to Washington in an orderly fashion. Jackson’s raid on the supply base at Manassas, 25 miles behind John Pope on August 25th, was key to the Union loss. Not only did they lose tons of supplies, but this prevented effective reinforcements, for a short period of time, from McClellan’s forces that had returned from the Peninsula. That, of course, was in addition to McClellan’s reluctance to help Pope. Herman Haupt was a genius at railroad repair. He saw to it that transportation was repaired in short order. Two examples of cavalry illustrate another form of supply losses. The first is the October 11th interdiction of a wagon train by JEB Stuart near Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. This action did much to alarm the Union, build Stuart’s reputation, but did not make a material impact on the war effort of the United States. He did manage to destroy many wagons and capture 500 horses before returning to Virginia. That same Pennsylvania town was to sustain further war damage later , but once again it had no strategic impact. Raiding works best when you have a low ratio of enemy forces to space. Further, it is more successful when you have a friendly civilian population. This worked against Stuart in the East, but the strategy favored Southern raiders in the West. This is because Stuart had neither small enemy forces opposing him nor large space in which to range. And, of course, Pennsylvania did not have a friendly population.
The
next short vignette does take place in the West and involves a
popular bit of folklore, that the Union soldiers discarded clothing
and equipment by the side of the road during long marches. The time
is October 1862. The quartermasters are trying to supply Buell’s
army out of Louisville in the direction of Bardstown, Kentucky. As
the army began a march during a heat wave, the exhausted troops
began discarding everything they deemed “unnecessary.” Clothing,
blankets, and other items were strewn along the route of march.
While this did indeed happen, it was the exception and not
the rule. Wagon trains supplied the army in this area because the
railroads had been destroyed. As the army advanced you had
increasing distances over which supplies had to move. A small
footnote should record that these supply trains could easily
retrieve the “dropped” gear. The management of this resupply
operation is a key factor in this story of logistics. These trains
were put on the roads in groups of 100 wagons each. The shipment had
a train manifest so that the shipping point, the destination point,
and the train itself knew what goods were on the train. The content
of these manifests is what the speaker will call later on as
“information.” Each train had a quartermaster officer on board
responsible for the goods. On October 19th John Morgan’s cavalry hit
one of these trains of 82 wagons of which only 51 were loaded. While
it was a total loss, it did not have a big impact on the supply of
the army due to situational awareness.
Bob’s final example is the horrible defeat of the Union at Fredericksburg in December of 1862. It is ironic that the same Rappahannock River that caused the delay in the meeting of the two armies also saved the Union equipment from falling into enemy hands. Very little supplies crossed with the men on those fateful days. And the river prevented Lee from pursuing the hapless Burnside. Thus, all of the means of war was still in Union hands for the pivotal year of 1863. With these nine examples behind us we have set the
stage for the true story of Northern Supply. Bob has named his
presentation, “Manna From Heaven”
because the effective use of the North’s production engine preordained
that the Union would prevail if only it had the political will to
continue the struggle. A few numbers illustrate this point. During the
fiscal year ending 1 June 1860, the country possessed some 128,300
industrial establishments of which 110,274 were located in states that
remained in the Union. The most heavily industrialized states, New York
and Pennsylvania, each had more industry than all the seceding states
combined. Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts each had a larger
commercial and industrial property investment than the South as a whole.
Finally, the North contributed 92.5% of the $1.9 billion that comprised
the total value of annual product in the country in 1860. While these
figures are very well known, we tend to forget them when we delve into
the glory and action of war. Roughly speaking, “supply” to a Civil War era army
consists of animals, feed for animals, transportation equipment (road,
rails, & water) and the materials for their maintenance, rations, arms,
munitions, clothing, camp equipage, and fuel. That last item was very
small in wars fought prior to the Civil War, but the use of railroads
and steam ships changed all that. Going beyond the stuff of supplies,
logistics means getting the goods from where they are to where they need
to be. Bob related that he had spent 11 years building computer models
to solve this problem.
“Trust me; it is not an easy dragon to slay!”
Let’s come at this in a slightly different way.
It is estimated that it cost 1,000
1862 dollars per year to keep a private in the field. At 13.00
1862 dollars per month, this
amounts to wages of 156 1862
dollars per year (which equals 24,960
2009 dollars per year. The rest, 844
1862 dollars per year, would be
for support and that converts to 21,100
2009 dollars per year. In total, it would take 46,060
2009 dollars to keep one soldier
in the field for one year. At any one time the North fielded between
700,000 and 1,000,000 men!
Although no one knew it at the time the Civil War
would cost the Union one billion rounds of small arms ammunition, one
million horses and mules, 1.5 million barrels of pork, 100 million
pounds of coffee, six million woolen blankets, and ten million pairs of
trousers. Take a minute to let these numbers sink in. All this was done
without computerized manufacturing and inventory control. When the conflict began each individual state
raised its own regiments, the traditional standard building block of a
mid 19th century army. This consisted of men AND materiel. The manpower
was indeed supplied by the state in question. This was not a problem.
The supplies, however, were a big problem. It was not the commonly
believed issue of corrupt politicians earmarking contracts to their
favorite producers. Rather there were only a few companies who had the
size necessary to fulfill these large contracts. For example, there were
only a handful of arms manufacturers who could even supply rifles and
muskets let alone large bore cannons. Even textile mills labored to
produce the clothing needed to equip the states’ huge orders.
When President Lincoln called for 75,000 troops on April 15, 1861
state official were confused about who was going to supply what.
Governors across the North wired Washington trying to get a handle on
what this call up meant logistically. Each state began to make
purchases, each in their own way. This made for a very decentralized and
disorganized pattern of procurement. To make matters worse national
figures, like Secretary of War Simon Cameron, set up parallel channels
of supply and tried to coordinate this effort with the various states.
It should come as no surprise that state officials tended to fill
military orders by dealing with business and workers within their
states. It should bring a smile to your face to read that
when New York State first sought to buy uniforms, it gave the whole
12,000 unit award to Brooks Brothers. The uniforms that they delivered
were so badly made that they neither fit nor held up in use. As was
often the case when buying from a short list of manufacturers all of the
state procurement officers collided on the same doorstep. For example
when Indiana agent Bob Owen visited New York blanket manufacturer, A. T.
Stewart & Co., he found that the federal government had gotten there
first. By the fall of 1861 Meigs began to do the obvious. He shifted
supply from this decentralized system to a more centralize model. This
could not be made to work all at one time. So it was not until the
spring of 1862 that central supply really took hold. Local buying continued throughout the time period
of this presentation. The reason this ship, “Logistics” could not be
turned on a dime was somewhat technical, but there was a healthy
component of state-federal conflict involved. Illinois was still doing
its own supply as late as the battle of Fredericksburg.
For the most part, these exceptions notwithstanding, by 1862 the
logistical system of the United States military was centralized with
Montgomery Meigs in control. In the words of Shelby Foote, during the Civil War
we went from “the United States are” to “the United States is.” This
move toward centralization went a long way into making that happen. What
Meigs, and others, did to make it happen is the subject for the rest of
this presentation. We started this evening with
Bob’s Question and discovered
in the course of nine examples that the premise on which it was based
was false. That realization led to exploring the true nature of supply
in the 1860s. Now it is time to investigate just how the people running
the show made it happen. This did not happen overnight.
From his first days in office, Jesup showed a
remarkably clear grasp of the problems of military supply. In Bob’s
opinion Jesup was way ahead of his time. Many of his concepts and ideas
are still used in military and industrial logistics today. After he had
served ten years as Quartermaster General he was brevetted Major General
for conspicuous and efficient service. The functions of the
Quartermaster Department had been gradually enlarged to include all
purchasing for the Army.
Soon after his appointment he wrote a letter to Secretary of War Calhoun
to say that he knew his office was “one of high responsibility.” He went
on to further say that he would have to build the new bureau from the
bottom up. In doing so, Jesup wrote, he would need “to introduce system
into a Department, hitherto without arrangement, without organization.”
Here is what he did over the next four decades to
make that happen: Jesup promulgated regular procedures that required
each quartermaster officer at each supply depot around the country to
submit monthly and quarterly reports to Washington. Washington would
know what is in each location and how that was changing over time. He
instructed his officers to use 37 standard paper forms. Stop right here
and think about this 1825 example of systematic management:
37 documents can control an Army!
And these reports were not just sent to headquarters and filed.
Jesup had a team of officers studying these papers to manage the
business of defense. If something was amiss or not clear after close
scrutiny the reports were sent back for correction. The quartermaster’s
shop was run to exacting standards in the 40 year run up to the civil
war. This was extraordinary during a time when such a thing was
virtually unheard of in either American government or business. Although
he is seldom recognized as such, Jesup ranks as a pioneer of systematic
management. In addition to the creation of a 19th century management information system of awesome power, Jesup was a “people person.” He surrounded himself with a cadre of young bright managers to execute his plans. In July of 1838 Congress passed new legislation which allowed for 30 commissioned quartermaster officers at the rank of captain or above. Of the original 30, nine would serve as senior quartermasters for the North in the Civil War. This gave the Union a great deal of continuity. The importance of the systems developed by Jesup is why Miller entitled his book on Montgomery Meigs: Second Only to Grant.
We all appreciate the employment of the telegraph
but we fail to notice what the information allowed the user to do. For
the first time in history, a war could be managed from great distance.
It was not the telegraph per se
but the information “singing in the wires” that made it so.
All of Jesup’s careful design of an information system could now
be in Meigs’ hands in an instant.
The stress is on “could be,” as not everything was transmitted by
wire. In Jesup’s early days, circa 1825 when he developed his system, it
took days or weeks for the data to arrive in Washington.
Now it could take minutes. For the first time you could control a
battle in real time. Although we could go into detail about many of the
forms, plus the many informal telegraph messages and letters that were
transmitted, let us focus on just three. First of these was the inventory folio. In its paper format it was a spreadsheet with hundreds of columns printed on large sheets of folio paper. Each column represented an item handled by the quartermaster in the field. Examples of these columns included “forage,” “transportation items,” “camp clothing,” and “garrison equipage.” The rows represented items which came into stock, the amount of goods that were stored in a location, and the items which were released from the facility. Remember, these reports were issued monthly. These sheets could be created in Louisville and reproduced in Washington, DC, or in any other location with “a need to know.” We do not know the extent that these forms were being transmitted electronically, but Bob found numerous examples of their being wired. The Taylor book often mentioned Perkins telegraphed Nashville to request supplies and to inquire where the ordered materiel was. Even more than the book, in her dissertation that was the basis for the book, we find footnote after footnote saying: “Telegram, Simon Perkins to…”
T The last form we will consider is the
purchase order.
Requisitions were on standard forms. A requisition had to be filled out
by the responsible QM officer and authorized by the commanding officer
of the particular command unit. An interesting example occurred when
Perkins was at Gallipolis, Ohio, in spring 1864. This is outside of our
time frame, but when you hear the names you will understand why it is
included. He received a number of requisitions for the 23rd Ohio
Infantry. These were submitted by Lt. William McKinley, the unit’s
regimental quartermaster. And, get this, they were signed by Col.
Rutherford B. Hayes, the commander of the regiment. Those documents are
unique and very valuable, as they contain the only known samples of two
future presidents' signatures on the same item! There is a further benefit that accrues once you
speed up an information system. You can make a trade off of information
for stuff. During Bob’s entire professional career he developed, sold,
and implemented logistical control software. Much of this was inventory
control. And what is the object of inventory control? It is to
accomplish the mission, be that a lean manufacturing company or an army.
If you know what the demands for stuff are you can hold back the goods
and ship them just in time to where they are needed. Think about this
for a minute. Without a rapid reaction system a depot might have to
supply two units who might go into combat with two complete sets of
materials. With a rapid reaction system you may need only supply one
unit. Then, sometime later you might ship the excess to the second unit.
Thus the overall amount of stuff that has to be handled is far smaller.
You have traded information for stuff. That is all well and good for
modern times. How did this inventory theory work out during the Civil
War? At the end of July, 1862 Perkins was supplying
Buell’s army in northern Alabama using railroad connections from
Nashville to Decatur, AL. When the railroad service was disrupted he was
forced to reroute his supplies using telegraph messages.
Instead of storing all of the supplies in the forward areas where
Buell’s army might go he could ship the goods a long distance and keep
changing the destination as Buell shifted position. He could do this
even when his supply line was interdicted by enemy action, when Buell’s
supply officers made errors in their orders, and when other’s made
demands on theater inventories. What Perkins was doing was trading
information for stuff. If you have the information you may not need as
much stuff.
Bob then gave us a one minute lesson on inventory
control. It is all about levels and flows. An accountant would reflect
the level of an asset, like rifles in a depot, on a balance sheet. It is
the number of weapons you have at any one instant of time. Contrast that
with the income statement that reflects the flow of stock during a
period of time bounded by a start time and an ending time. For example,
how many rifles were received during the month of March 1862? The
reports, documents, telegraph transmissions, and verbal communications
about inventory have one or both of these concepts at the heart of the
control mechanism. You can read this into Swords’ droll comment. Taylor relates that Simon Perkins had a natural
talent for accurate record keeping. He probably acquired this gift from
his business experience before the war. Sometimes this passion for
detail, which infected the entire Quartermaster Department, reached
ridiculous ends. Take for example the great gunny sack return program.
Meigs introduced a cost saving measure in August of 1861. He ordered the
recycling of gunny sacks used to hold animal feed. His reasoning was
that the reuse of grain sacks, that cost seven cents each, three or four
times would save the government money. By the summer of 1862 Meigs
ordered Swords who ordered Perkins to return empty sacks to Louisville
for reuse. This was folly because the cost of collecting, returning, and
accounting for the bags overwhelmed the savings. Think of the manpower
and transportation costs involved. All this was going on with an army in
the field whose location was constantly changing. Keeping up with empty
gunny sacks and returning them to the appropriate supply officer would
have been an onerous task for a unit that remained in one place, let
alone an army on the march. Nevertheless, Perkins gave an excellent
accounting for this government property. Everyone who was involved in
the bag exchange had to exchange the appropriate documents. In this the
levels and flows were accurately accounted. This story may be “cute,”
but don’t miss the importance of systematic management that backs this
tale. Everything from warships to gunny sacks was managed in a highly
professional manner. That is the real point. One of the best stories of Civil War logistics happened in November of 1863. When the terrible news of the battle of Chickamauga reached Washington in September, Lincoln met with his cabinet to discuss what to do. Stanton proposed that 30,000 troops could be shifted from Meade’s army and reach Rosecrans in five days. He was mocked: If the order was given today, the troops could even not reach Washington in five days. Stanton backed down just a little. The order was given on September 23rd that 23,000 men were to move. Command was given to Hooker -- you remember Joe who got his clock cleaned at Chancellorsville -- and the trains started to roll. Why does this belong a story about supply? You all know by now that men and materiel move by written communications. By noon on the 24th the most powerful railroad officials in the nation were in Stanton’s office. They were planning routes, timetables, and requirements for engines and rolling stock; troops were assembled at the loading stations. Railroad schedules had to be instantaneously altered. Once again the telegraph was the technology, but Stanton’s plan was the information. The route was cleared and Hooker’s men were entrained on the 25th for Bridgeport, TN. The first of the men arrived, after a trip of 1,200 miles, in 7 days. The last of the men came in 4½ days later. OK, Stanton was a tad off his 5 day forecast, but it was not until the middle of the 20th century that this logistics feat was duplicated. In order to be “fair and balanced,” all did not go as smoothly as just indicated. Hooker’s forces arrived in Nashville with no transportation. Their wagons, teams, and teamsters had only begun leaving Virginia on October 4th, did not arrive for another two weeks. Further, supplies for this large wagon train were not released, as ordered, from the Army of the Potomac. So, again with the aid of the telegraph, wagon supplies that were intended for Nathaniel Banks were rerouted to Hooker. It seems that throughout the war “Commissary Banks” was always supplying someone else’s army. All of the local quartermaster decision- making fell on the shoulders of our old friend Simon Perkins. It was he who rounded up wagons and teams to support this effort. And he did it while the supply system sustained much interdiction from the enemy. Although he was able to scrounge some of the needs, it was only the arrival of Hooker’s wagon train of some 600 general wagons and 150 ambulances that saved the day. In the middle of all this activity Quartermaster General Meigs himself appeared on the scene in Tennessee. Now the logistical commands flashed back and forth between Meigs and Stanton. This is not unlike the control of Central Command in the Middle East today that is run out of MacDill Air Force base in Tampa, FL. Let us review where we are: We started with Bob’s Question. And we concluded that Bob did not know what he was talking about. The North did not drop a lot of stuff on the battlefield. However, the South did get a great horde by seizing Federal installations. We then discussed nine instances of setbacks for the Union and how that really was not a great tragedy of supply. That study led us to investigate the true nature of supply. We just wrapped up how the Union supplied its armies in the field using the programs laid down by Jesup.
Meigs had high standards, but he often got what
every commander got: some excellent, some average, and some downright
poor individuals. It was to his credit that he could use the excellent,
improve the average, and get rid of the poor. Here was what he wanted in
a quartermaster officer. They should be “good accountants and persons
who have been engaged in business of a mercantile character.” If getting
good men was an issue, keeping them was a greater challenge. In the
fighting services you could expect promotion. Not so in the
Quartermaster’s Department. Men who employed thousands of workers,
managed strategic shipping operations, or disbursed millions of dollars
of government funds remained captains for the duration of the war.
While some cases of corruptions did occur it was rare. There are
three reasons for this: 1/ Oversight by Meigs and the War
Department, 2/ the situation of military service, and 3/
the officer’s personal integrity. Lack of manpower had both positive and negative
aspects. One of the best aspects was the short chain of command. A
captain in the field, like Simon Perkins, could wire Swords in
Cincinnati who in turn could consult with Meigs and Stanton in
Washington, DC. This could take place within minutes and the requests,
plans, and orders could be carried out within hours.
If shortages of manpower seemed to have caused little, if any,
disruption in quartermaster services, it was primarily due to the
capability of the individual supply officers and the overall
organization of the department. The balance of Bob’s presentation involved a more
detailed description of Meigs, Swords and Perkins, how their backgrounds
made them so fit for their positions; how they were selected; and how
they illustrate Bob’s major premise: how a few good men in supply could
win the war! Unlike Lincoln’s problems with his fighting
commanders, his chief supply officer, Montgomery C. Meigs had
uninterrupted tenure from June 1861 until the end of the war. He was
responsible for the outstanding operations during Bob’s period of
interest in particular and the whole war in general.
It is hard to conceive of a better person in the role of
Quartermaster General then Meigs. Although inferior in rank to the major
generals who fought the battles, the brigadier general who ran the
logistics of the war had more to do with the outcome than all but a few
of them. His department spent more money than all of the other bureaus
of the War Department combined. What was it that made Meigs so
outstanding? He entered West Point in 1832 and graduated fifth
in his class of 49. Not only was he an outstanding officer, but he was a
cracker jack civil engineer. That subject was the most important at the
Point. Although born in Georgia, he considered himself a citizen of the
United States. He worked for a number of years in various engineering
assignments including one with Capt. Robert E. Lee on the Mississippi
River. The Mexican War came and went without his active participation.
Meigs was disappointed as war meant promotion and he was “stuck”
performing engineering jobs. He did these jobs well. In November of 1852
he was stationed in Washington, DC where he was to spend the rest of his
life. He now was put in charge of some very important engineering
projects. These included construction of a new aqueduct for the city,
additions to the Capitol Building, and remodeling the Post Office.
During the Buchanan administration conflicts with Secretary of War John
B. Floyd caused Capt. Meigs to be “banished” to the Dry Tortugas for a
year. When the Lincoln administration took office the new president was
informed of the reputation of this officer. Lincoln then said: “I do not
know one who combines the qualities of masculine intellect, learning and
experience of the right sort, and physical power of labor and endurance
as well as he.” On May 17, 1861, Captain Meigs was promoted to
Colonel and then less than a month later to Brigadier General and put in
charge of Jesup’s old department.
Meigs had not been in the office a year when George Templeton
Strong described him as “an exceptional and refreshing specimen of sense
and promptitude, unlike most of our high military officials. There is
not a fiber of red tape in his constitution.” Right from his first days
in office he was clearly in command. He had that rare quality in
management that allowed him to prioritize work. He first set about the
task of supplying horses to the army. While, as in men as in horse
flesh, he would have rather bought perfect horses, the issue was
quantity in the days after Bull Run. He organized a system of
contracting, stabling, and distribution of horses so as to provide a
working transportation system. Water and rail transport was the premium,
but getting supplies to the men in the field still depended on
horsepower. This was not to change until after World War I. Meigs kept careful supervision of the contracting mechanism. He had two rules which kept corruption to a minimum. These are examples of why he was such an effective leader. First, he continued a policy that had served him well in his career up to this point. He would not employ kith or kin. When his younger brother Samuel joined the army in December of 1861 as a quartermaster no less, he kept him out of Washington and away from the office of the Quartermaster General. Second, and this was most important, he did not interfere with the decisions of the field quartermasters. In particular, he let his subordinates select their own staff. Most of the stories so far are of modest scale, but Meigs could handle the giant ones too. Congress was advised in November of 1861 that money
that was slated to last until July 1, 1862 was all but gone. The
treasury was not paying for supplies already purchased. It was to Meigs
that Lincoln famously complained: "It is exceedingly discouraging.
General, what shall I do? The people are impatient; Chase has no money
and he tells me he can raise no more; the General of the Army has
typhoid fever. The bottom is out of the tub. What shall I do?” Meigs had
some ideas and together with Chase created “fiat” money. At the risk of
hyperinflation the government printed money. He actually went beyond
greenbacks and employed quartermasters’ vouchers and certificates of
indebtedness or IOUs. These circulated as money.
Because they were not abused inflation was kept at bay.
Perkins volunteered when Lincoln called for troops
in April 1861. His career as a private was short lived. In spite of the
fact that he could have used family connections to obtain a commission
in a fighting unit, Simon pursued the role of an army businessman.
Knowing the governor of Ohio certainly did not hurt his pursuit. In
February of 1862 he reported to Col. Swords in Louisville as a captain.
There was no training camp for supply officers. Everything they needed
to know had to be learned on the job or brought to the job from prior
experience. Nevertheless, Swords, like Meigs, hit the ground running.
While this is not a Civil War story, the following
will give you some idea of what kind of a “take charge” guy this chap
was. At the beginning of the war with Mexico, Swords rode with Stephen
Kearney to San Diego. Upon arrival he realized that there were few local
sources for clothing and other goods the men needed. Responding to this
problem he chartered a ship to take him to the Sandwich Islands, today’s
Hawaii, about 2,200 miles away. After 18 days at sea he landed in
Honolulu where he bought garments and construction materials on
government credit. He then sailed safely back and distributed his
supplies. From all accounts, Thomas Swords carried out his
duties both efficiently and effectively. In June of 1862 he was in
charge of the Louisville depot. A potential supplier approached Swords
offering a kick-back. Swords wrote the following back to the gentleman:
“In regard to my retaining ‘whatever per cent I wish to pay me for my
trouble’ I have to inform you that I am paid by the United States, for
trouble and everything else incident to my office.” Such were the men
serving in the Quartermaster’s Department.
It was very close to what Churchill said of the men of the RAF in
World War II. “Never in the field of human conflict was so much owed by
so many to so few.” Bob then responded to several questions at the end
of his most informative presentation. Any of you who want to view Bob’s presentation in
its entirety (before your Editor mangled it!), go to www.s-i-inc.com. Last changed: 08/07/10 |