Volume 30, No. 9 – September 2017
Website:
www.CivilWarRoundTablePalmBeach.org
President’s Message:
The Round Table has lost a long-time member, Monroe Ackerman. He passed
away on August 15th.
Monroe gave many presentations, and faithfully made the coffee
for our meetings. His presence will be sorely missed.
In October, William McEachern will present a program entitled:
The Break Through: The Fall of the Confederacy.
At the November meeting, Robert Krasner will speak about Rutherford B.
Hayes. He was a member of
the 23rd
Ohio regiment, lawyer, politician, philanthropist, president of the
National Prison Association, and father of eight.
Robert Macomber will be the Speaker in December.
Gerridine LaRovere
September 13, 2017 Program:
September will be the 30th
anniversary of the Round Table. We will celebrate with festivities
including a special raffle with a $30.00 gift card to Publix.
Our program will be fun and fascinating facts about the Civil War
that you might be surprised to learn.
August 9, 2017 Program:
 Our
speaker was
LTC (Ret.) Harold Knudsen.
The presentation drew from his book,
General James Longstreet the
Confederacy’s Most Modern General.
His writings come from his love of military history married up
with his experience with 20th Century Army doctrine, field training,
staff planning, command, and combat experience.
The South, on the
heels of two major losses at Gettysburg and Vicksburg was facing the
path to defeat if military fortunes could not be turned around in their
favor. General James
Longstreet, Robert E. Lee’s famed War Horse, had prior to the Gettysburg
Campaign, advocated addressing matters around Vicksburg, Mississippi as
a matter of strategic imperative.
He warned Lee that undertaking a strategic offensive into
Pennsylvania was not the correct priority.
Lee overruled him, and they went forward to meet failure at
Gettysburg. Lee then
realized his War Horse had been correct, and subsequently supported
Longstreet’s suggestion to reinforce Braxton Bragg in Georgia and
attempt to wrest the strategic initiative in that theater in the fall of
1863. Longstreet went west
with his corps, and won a stunning victory for Bragg at Chickamauga,
which swung the initiative to Bragg; generating many operational
opportunities that indeed promised to give the strategic initiative to
Bragg’s theater if he acted.
Bragg did not recognize his opportunities.
He decided upon a useless partial siege that eventually lost the
initiative. This allowed the
Union to reinforce Chattanooga, overmatch him, and retake the offensive.
Realistically, it was the Confederacy’s last chance to prevent
defeat.
Most interpretations
of the 1863 Chattanooga campaign claim the unchallenged establishment of
the supply line known as the “Cracker Line” was the decisive event that
caused the reversal of the initiative away from the Confederates and
gave it to the Union. It has
appeared so to many historians, but a defeat like Bragg’s is seldom the
result of a singular tactical event.
The painting of the Cracker Line in this campaign as the turning
point is probably due the tangible effects of lifting the hungry troop’s
morale by restoring full rations covered by the period newspapers and
recent historians, but the truth is, the Cracker Line was a temporary
logistical remedy. (The pontoon bridge established to accommodate the
first wagon loads brought through by Hooker, washed away shortly after
its first uses.) Actually,
steamers (with greater capacity than wagons) shuttling supplies between
Bridgeport and Chattanooga ensured the flow of full rations into
November. Also
contrary to many popular portrayals, General Longstreet not moving
troops into Lookout Valley and the restoration of full rations to
Thomas’ army did not cause the loss of the campaign for Bragg. (The
notion that the Confederates could have denied Union entrance into
Lookout Valley by emplacing troops in this terrain compartment is a
myth; as there were no less than ten ferries and fords where the Union
could cross between Caperton’s Ferry and Kelley’s Ferry.
Covering every one of these and not be flanked, attacked from the
rear, or cut off from Bragg’s main force on Missionary Ridge was
impossible.) The campaign
was largely lost before the Cracker Line was put in, and the true reason
for the Union success is found in the level of war between tactics and
strategy – Operational Art.
Through the prism of
Operational Art (initially an Industrial Age concept) Longstreet saw the
Union corps movements going on around Bragg were the decisive factors.
Tactical events in Lookout Valley, such as the Union bridgehead
at Brown’s Ferry, the night battle at Wauhatchie, the Cracker Line, and
Bragg’s idea to cut it with a division (or more), were irrelevant.
The key operational facet working against Bragg: the growing
Union Center of Gravity (CoG).
CoG is the key
aspect, that “thing” for simplicity sake, which gives an army its real
power. The CoG of the Union
Army in the Chattanooga campaign was the aggregate strength of all the
reinforcements brought into the area, plus the troops inside
Chattanooga, and also the troops in Knoxville, which all came under
Grants operational control.
While the logistics flow over Hailey’s Trace into Chattanooga was the
lifeline to Thomas, Bragg never made a serious attempt to cut it.
It is also a fact that supply throughput over Haley’s Trace was
sufficient to meet basic needs for the length of time the Union needed
to reinforce. Yet, Bragg
incorrectly thought Haley’s Trace was insufficient, so when the Cracker
Line was put in, he incorrectly identified it as the new CoG by
extension of his myopic tactical focus (even after Hooker linked up with
Thomas). And, as this
campaign illustrates, if one does not correctly figure out his
opponent’s CoG, then the planning and executing of operations that do
not solve the operational problem set will occur.
The opponent will gain the upper hand, and thus tactical actions,
even some successful ones, will not generate the right effects in the
operational realm.
Union CoG within the
Theater = Thomas + Hooker + Sherman + Burnside = 100,000 men
Planning irrelevant
tactical operations we see stemming from Bragg’s fixation with Lookout
Valley when Hooker marched into it on the 27th of October, 1863.
Stating the new supply line was “vital; it involves the very
existence of the enemy at Chattanooga” i.e. the CoG; Bragg wants James
Longstreet to do something about the alarming presence of a new Union
corps operating on his left flank.
Longstreet, however, understood the concepts that would embody
the level of war known in the latter 20th Century as Operational Art.
This type of intuition allowed him to see that the CoG was the
Union corps sized elements that were in the process of gathering.
The Union had already harnessed the key Decisive Point,
which was Bridgeport, Alabama.
Through an unchallenged reinforcement flow into Bridgeport, they
were building a position of dominance in the operational area.
Once Hooker became active, Longstreet knew they were in trouble,
and a major decision to change course was needed by Bragg.
But Longstreet is essentially forced by Bragg (who was in an
agitated state) to attempt a useless tactical action to satisfy Bragg’s
want of “doing something about it.”
They decide on a small scale night attack into Lookout Valley; an
irrelevant and indecisive spasm, which Longstreet planned against the
Union supply train parked in Wauhatchie.
This fails, due to several errors in coordination and other
misunderstandings, to put it mildly, but even if this raid had been
successful, the reality is that it would have had no effect upon the
Union CoG.
Next, Bragg has the idea to have Longstreet move troops into
Lookout Valley, but without any clear offensive objective.
Such a move could only be temporary.
If the Confederates committed large numbers of troops in Lookout
Valley, they would risk this force being cut off in the valley by a
Union thrust south of Lookout Mountain once Sherman joined Hooker.
Longstreet correctly did not follow Bragg’s idea of a blocking
position as it was not tactically sound or part of a clearer purpose.
Ordering a major operation such the one required was the job of
the commanding general, not a corps commander.
It was up to Bragg to decide upon a thorough course of action,
resource that course of action, and issue orders to all his corps
commanders to execute it. As
it were, most interpretations say that Bragg told Longstreet to use all
force necessary to redress the situation; which meant nothing.
Bragg never issued orders for the other two corps commanders to
place their divisions under Longstreet’s control, -- and corps
commanders don’t tell other corps commanders to simply
hand over troops.
Unless Bragg was going to the majority of his divisions in a
decisive strike against Bridgeport, neutralize or push Hooker away,
merely blocking the Cracker Line would not affect the growing Union CoG.
One point that makes
spreading forces for a tactical defense in Lookout Valley a poor choice
was the illusion of the hoped for Union starvation.
Bragg thought from the beginning of his partial siege, he could
cause starvation to collapse the Union hold on Chattanooga. Even though
Union soldiers in Chattanooga were for weeks on half rations (even
quarter rations some days) because of difficulties on the sixty-mile
long Haley’s Trace, they
were not starving. While
they were hungry, no Union soldiers were going to actually starve before
the initiative changed – even without the Cracker Line.
This is the essence of Bragg’s misidentification of the Union
CoG. Although little is
mentioned in the historiography, with the rising water level on the
Tennessee River (allowing some boats to clear the half dozen
obstructions along the way), the Union had steamer traffic between
Bridgeport and Chattanooga beginning early-mid November.
As a result Grant had two multi-modal supply routes running
concurrently into and around Chattanooga by mid-November.
Longstreet sums up the greatest logistical factor for the Union
is that: "they supplied that army for six weeks without the Cracker Line."
 The
event that changed the initiative to the Union was the unopposed Union
force flow into Bridgeport of forces under Hooker and Sherman.
The arrival of Joseph Hooker’s corps size element changed the
operational situation to the Confederates having to face the Union in
two directions (they had to face Thomas and now Hooker.)
Sherman’s arrival in November would bring Union operational
domination. This force flow
of reinforcements is the reason that also illustrates why the Cracker
Line was not the Decisive Point.
The Decisive Point of Bridgeport enabled Hooker to arrive and
operate on Bragg’s left/rear, Sherman to arrive and get into place; it
was the origin of Haley’s Trace, and the origin of steamer supply to
Chattanooga.
If you lose momentum,
you lose the initiative.
Bragg allowed this to occur with his partial siege.
Even though he had some time after the arrival of the first Union
units in Bridgeport on the 25th of September, he never acted against
Bridgeport, losing an opportunity to keep the initiative and further
isolate Thomas at Chattanooga.
After Longstreet had sent his artillery coordinator, Porter
Alexander to recon the area, and then envisioned an operational level
strike against Bridgeport to achieve precisely these effects, Longstreet
presented this plan to Bragg (as well as President Davis).
Davis told Bragg to execute it, but Bragg would not; his
continued inaction further contributed his defeat.
Grant’s superior numbers and taking the initiative with many of
the facets of Operational Art working in his favor by November allowed
him the freedom to execute operational maneuver against Bragg’s army.
Many like to
speculate the “what if” had Bragg kept Longstreet, and not detached him
to go after Knoxville.
Ostensibly, would Bragg have been stronger and better able to face Grant
in a defensive battle on Missionary Ridge?
Perhaps, and although Grant decided upon a double envelopment of
Bragg’s position on Missionary Ridge the 23rd of November, 1863, it is
worth mentioning he had many options to exercise against Bragg.
Certainly, the “unexpected” frontal assault by Thomas straight up
the ridge into Bragg’s center was a surprise success.
Perhaps if Thomas had attacked Longstreet’s two crack divisions
positioned atop Missionary Ridge (Longstreet’s troops had good
experience setting up a kill zone such as the one they created at
Fredericksburg), Thomas might have suffered a costly repulse.
Still, if Grant’s attacks had failed, and Missionary Ridge proved
too tough a position to take with the plan he started with, the battle
was not over. Grant could
use his superior numbers to both fix Bragg and maneuver around to cut
Bragg’s rail line of supply, forcing him off the ridge that way, for
example. Grant never gave up
after one course of action proved ineffective, he consistently tried
something different. From an
operational planning standpoint, Grant had set the conditions to
dominate once he had overmatched Bragg.
The added bonus of Bragg’s unwise choice to spread out his
forces, sending Longstreet to Knoxville, and another 11,000 troops
halfway between, only made his victory more overwhelming.
The myth that the Chattanooga campaign was lost in Lookout
Valley in the tactical level from the establishment of a supply line is
incorrect. The operational
level corps movements decided this campaign.
Earlier, Bragg had recognized an operational opportunity that the
spread out Union corps prior to Chickamauga presented; and he correctly
chose to strike them under those circumstances.
During Chattanooga, however, he
was not attuned to
the facets of the operational level, and he subsequently lost several
opportunities during this campaign.
Although operational
concepts can be found in earlier wars, they were generally aligned with
the strategic level of war.
Earlier examples, such as the 1781 Yorktown campaign, contained many of
the operational facets.
(There was no professional military education that taught officers to
distinguish a level of war between tactics and strategy.)
However, the synchronization of the land and sea forces and
functions was done in slow motion compared to how quickly a corps
(larger in 1863 than entire armies in the Revolutionary War) could move
in 1863. The concepts that
comprise modern Operational Art became more distinguishable with the
advances of rail, allowing large corps to move great distances quickly,
and as the telegraph allowed coordination of the movements.
At Chattanooga Bragg stuck to the tactical; unable to intuitively
change dimensions, and thus he misidentified the Union CoG.
 James
Longstreet recognized the CoG clearly in this campaign.
His professional experiences and the culture of how he and Lee
reviewed their operations brought Longstreet to the necessary level and
ability where he could intuitively determine a course of action to
counter the Union CoG. From
this he envisioned a strike against Bridgeport, Alabama designed to
restore maneuver for the Confederates, eliminate the primary Union force
flow entry point, and keep apart the Union Corp’s so that they could not
support and cooperate with each other.
By overlaying Longstreet’s operational thinking, it becomes clear
that the myths of tactical actions in Lookout Valley and conclusions
about the Cracker Line as the decisive events miss the mark.
Lee’s Warhorse had it right: Bridgeport, not Lookout Valley was
the key to Chattanooga.
[Editor’s note:
At this point, LTC Knudsen’s materials, which he sent by e.mail
ends. His talk, however,
went on. The next remarks
are from my memory of what he said.]
Knudsen introduced
our group to the modern day concept of Operational Art, the level of war
that interrelates tactics and strategy.
Before the advent of
highspeed logistics, the commanders handled strategy
and the officers in the field translated this into tactics.
As the above story demonstrates, Longstreet saw that the
strategic plan to eliminate the Union army in Tennessee could not be
done by tactics alone as Bragg had tried.
Longstreet’s vision of the CoG saw the need to eliminate the
source of supply from Bridgeport indirectly, by seizing a Decisive
Point. This was far short of
a strategy, but far more than a series of tactical maneuvers and/or
battles. Bragg never got it.
The presentation
illuminated this with illustrations from the long past and more recent
past. One illustration was
General Douglas MacArthur and the Inchon landing.
The strategy was to push Chinese and North Koreans out of the
Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur
reasoned that tactics like Bragg used to punch at Thomas would not work.
He used operational art to land at the “unlandable” port of
Inchon and push across the narrow peninsular to cut off the north’s
supplies and possibly encircle the enemy.
The tactics at Inchon involved the capture of an airfield, the
destruction by air power of a massed tank counter stroke, and the
liberation of Seoul. I would
argue that Longstreet and MacArthur both had the 14 points listed below
well in hand.
Last changed: 08/22/17
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