June 11, 2025
Program:
Good evening. As you know,
my name is Robert Schuldenfrei.
The topic for this presentation is
Civil War Leaders and West Point.
To illustrate the pedagogy, I have chosen six leaders who I
believe illustrates my point of the influence of West Point on the Civil
War. These generals are
Pierre G.T. Beauregard, Ulysses S. Grant, William J. Hardee, Robert E.
Lee, George B. McClellan, and Phil H. Sheridan.
It would be ridiculous to attribute to West Point the sole reason
for their behavior during the war.
That would ignore their upbringing, social life, the war with
Mexico, and a great number of other factors.
However, my point tonight is that the academy had significant
influence on these men.
The United States Military Academy was founded under the administration
of Thomas Jefferson in 1802.
Its reason for being was to provide a cadre of officers around
which to form a large army in times of emergency.
Right from the start it was to reflect the values of the new
nation by drawing the Corps of Cadets from all classes, not just the
upper classes as was the model of European military schools.
It was to allow the raising of an army when the need arose and
avoid a large standing army.
Often the armies of Europe exploited the societies they were
supposed to defend. America
needed a defense policy that was both revolutionary and rational.
 The
first years of the school were really hard ones for West Point.
The academy’s foundation was the Corps of Engineers.
Until Sylvanus Thayer took over as superintendent in 1817 the
school struggled and nearly went out of existence.
He is known as the "Father of the Military Academy."
The principles he laid down formed the basis of the curriculum,
some of which continue to today
Thayer made civil engineering the foundation of the curriculum.
For the first half century, graduates were largely responsible
for the construction of the bulk of the nation's initial railway lines,
bridges, harbors, and roads.
Many of these works had an impact on the Civil War.
Colonel Thayer's time at West Point ended with his resignation in
1833, after a disagreement with President Andrew Jackson.
Of our six cadets of interest only Robert E. Lee, class of 1829,
was enrolled during the tenure of Thayer.
It is interesting to note that Lee himself was superintendent
from 1852 until 1855.
No discussion of mid-century West Point would be complete without
introducing Dennis Hart
Mahon. He was an instructor
of civil and military engineering from 1824 to 1871.
He is pertinent to our story because historians agree that he had
great influence over all cadets who went on to command during the Civil
War. His focus was on the
teaching of Antoine-Henri Jomini.
This meant the emphasizing combined arms tactics – the
integrating different combat elements, such as infantry, artillery, and
cavalry.
Mahan was known for his discipline, hard work, sternness, and
dedication, traits that defined his teaching approach.
Despite his stern demeanor, he intervened for struggling cadets
and took pride in their achievements, reflecting a mentorship style that
balanced rigor with support.
His role as an instructor at West Point was not merely
educational but transformative, shaping the strategic and engineering
foundations of the U.S. military.
His textbooks, mentorship, and curriculum innovations ensured his
teachings resonated far beyond his lifetime, leaving a legacy that is
studied to this day.
Beyond teaching of principles, facts, and historical references, Mahan
stressed reason and common sense.
Following in the footsteps of Jomini, stressed that speed,
maneuver, logistics, and movement are more important than the
destruction of the enemy.
Lee seemed to take this into account.
His study of Jomini’s interpretations of Napoleon shaped his
preference for dividing enemy forces and striking at weak points.
His campaigns, like the Seven Days Battle in 1862 and
Chancellorsville in 1863, reflected this influence through bold,
aggressive maneuvers and attempts to outmaneuver Union forces, even when
outnumbered. Early in the
war, Lee had been called "Granny Lee" for his allegedly timid style of
command. However, on June
25th, he surprised the Army of the Potomac and launched a rapid series
of bold attacks. The Army
of Northern Virginia move from one battle to the next whether it had won
the fight or not. Lee moved
forward and McClellan moved back.
Chancellorsville was even more dramatic.
Lee had a smaller force than Hooker and yet he divided it such
that he had forces on many sides of the Army of the Potomac.
That day maneuver trumped mass on the field of battle.
Jomini looking down from heaven must have had a smile on his
face.
Grant too, by fighting in all areas of operations at the same time was
able to control all of his forces as one.
He made good use of the new technology of telegraph
communications to bring their forces together for battle.
For example, once Grant got to the eastern bank of the
Mississippi River in the Vicksburg campaign, he was able to operate on
Jomini’s principles of interior lines and maneuver.
He fought a series of battles to the south and east of the city
before the siege and victory.
We also can illustrate the effects of Mahan’s teaching on George B.
McClellan. Mahan taught
McClellan it was better to take strategic points rather that destruction
of armies, unlike Grant.
The academy's emphasis on Jomini’s theories prioritized controlled
maneuver-based warfare and securing key geographic points.
He preferred large, well-organized armies and avoided risky,
aggressive engagements, aiming to outmaneuver opponents strategically.
This influenced McClellan’s cautious, methodical, and
logistics-focused style as a commander.
He did Jomini proud in developing a base of operations.
He built and built up the Army of the Potomac many times under
his tenure.
William J. Hardee influenced the United States Military Academy as a
teacher and was shaped by it as a student.
He literally wrote the book on tactics in his 1855 book Rifle and
Light Infantry Tactics. As
a cadet in the Class of 1838, Hardee’s West Point education provided him
with a foundation in tactics, discipline, and strategic thinking that
made him one of the Confederacy’s most effective corps commanders.
In 1862 Hardee had command of one of the two wings of Bragg's
Army of Mississippi outside of Perryville, KY.
Hardee had selected Perryville for a few reasons.
The village of approximately 300 residents had an excellent road
network with connections to nearby towns in six directions, allowing for
strategic flexibility. It
was located to prevent the Federals from reaching the Confederate supply
depot in Bryantsville.
Finally, it was a potential source of water.
Thanks in part to Hardee’s planning and execution Braxton Bragg
had arguably won a tactical victory, having fought aggressively and
pushed his opponent back for over a mile.
Hardee returned to West Point to serve as Commandant of Cadets in 1856.
He thought that the students should have more instruction in the
art of strategy than they were getting and offered to have the tactical
department provide it. In
the past Thayer made the same proposal.
Professor Mahan protested that he was already teaching the
subject in his engineering classes.
The trouble was that Mahon spent so much time on military and
civil engineering that he only had a few days left over for strategy.
So, in 1860, with the support of Secretary of War Jefferson
Davis, the teaching of strategy was transferred to the tactical
department. Of course,
shortly thereafter Hardee and Davis were both gone.
Ambrose makes the point that in January of 1863, when things were not
going well for the Union, there was the appropriations bill for West
Point on the Senate floor.
Senator Trumball said, emphasis placed by the Academy on mathematics and
fortifications was the cause of the Union’s defeats.
Trumble went on “Take off your engineering
restraints…Dismiss…from the Army every man who knows how to build
fortifications, and let the men of the North, with their strong arms and
indomitable spirit, move down upon the rebels, and I tell you they will
grind them to powder in their power.”
The attempt to destroy the Academy failed.
Some of the Republicans who voted against the resolution noted
that the Yankee armies who were being defeated, after all, by West
Pointers who were displaying imagination and dash, the chief culprit
being former Superintendent Robert E. Lee.
The charges of incompetent training had a false ring.
The North it seemed, had just got the wrong graduates.
Southern graduates did better, in the early years of the war, than their
northern classmates for a number of reasons.
Their troops were better.
The rural South produced soldiers who were used to firearms and
outdoor living. They were
on the defensive and fighting in their own country with short supply
lines and a friendly population.
Until 1863 morale was higher.
Until Halleck and Stanton came to the War Department, the
Confederate Army was better organized.
Confederate cavalry was clearly superior, not only because it was
better led but because the southerners sat on their horses better.
Leaders like Lee, Jackson, and the two Johnstons – were career
soldiers who had served as professional soldiers most of their adult
lives. The leading Union
officers resigned from the Army after the Mexican War to followed
civilian pursuits. George
Thomas was one of the few who remained – Grant, Sherman, McClellan, and
Halleck had all been civilians.
In 1861 they had to readjust, and it took time; the Confederates
did not.
When the tide turned in the summer of 1863 the North had her two
greatest victories, Vicksburg and Gettysburg, both won under
Academy-trained men. The
war was finally being won.
Grant, Sherman, Meade, Sheridan, and other professionals were becoming
heroes; McClellan and Buell, the leading conservative Democrats in the
army, were gone. Halleck
had become a Republican.
The critics left West Point alone.
The focus of a West Point education due to Thayer was built upon the
study of engineering and mathematics.
This approach made a great deal of sense when the regular army
which would receive these cadets numbered a little more than six
thousand in the early 1830s.
Small though it was, this force undertook a variety of tasks.
The regulars’ routine duties included manning the coastal
defenses, exploring, mapping, policing the West and building bridges,
railroads, and canals.
 Let’s
focus on mathematics first.
In our time period, there was one teacher who was a standout.
Albert E. Church graduated first in the class of 1828 and was
commissioned in the Artillery, there being no vacancies in the Corps of
Engineers. Thayer requested
that Church stay at West Point to teach mathematics, and there he
remained except for the two years starting 1832, when he joined his
artillery unit. In 1837, he
became professor of mathematics.
Church served as a professor until his death in 1878, a total of
fifty years.
A large portion of the Fourth and Third Classes, Freshman and Sophomore,
were devoted to math. It
was indeed impressive. The
cadets took Algebra, Plane & Solid Geometry, Plane & Spherical
Trigonometry, Mensuration (the branch of mathematics that studies the
measurement of geometric figures and their parameters like length,
volume, shape, surface area, lateral surface area, etc.), Analytic
Geometry, and Differential & Integral Calculus.
Mathematics was by far the leading producer of academic
casualties. By itself that
subject accounted for 43% of all failures.
The weakness in math led to failures in other subjects.
This amounted for 35% more leading to the conclusion that 78% of
all academic failures were attributable wholly or in part to
mathematics. In order to
remain high in class rank you had not only to be good in math but to
excel in it.
Three of our six candidates were ranked second in their class at West
Point. Pierre G.T.
Beauregard was 2nd out of 45 in the class of 1838, Robert E. Lee was 2nd
out of 46 in the class of 1827, and George B. McClellan was 2nd out of
59 in the class of 1846.
All three excelled in mathematics.
It has been noted that if you were from a good family and had
excellent early education you probably had a good background in
arithmetic and went on to learn many of the above listed courses in
secondary school.
Beauregard’s artillery setup was a textbook application of his West
Point training and engineering skills.
By encircling Sumter with batteries, he ensured a crossfire that
maximized psychological and physical pressure on the Union garrison.
Here is where Grok was a big help.
The AI provided two pages of information when I asked: “How did
Pierre G.T. Beauregard set up his artillery in order to fire on Fort
Sumter?” After all of the
details, including equations, Grok summarized the answer like this.
“Pierre G.T. Beauregard’s mathematical skills were integral to
the success of the Fort Sumter bombardment.
He applied geometry and trigonometry to position 19 batteries
around Charleston Harbor, ensuring a devastating crossfire.
Ballistic calculations, rooted in projectile motion equations,
guided the accurate fire of mortars, Columbiads, and smoothbores, while
triangulation and range tables enabled precise targeting.
Arithmetic underpinned logistics, from ammunition allocation to
firing schedules, and timing calculations synchronized the 34-hour
barrage. These efforts,
grounded in Beauregard’s West Point training and artillery experience,
forced Fort Sumter’s surrender and marked the start of the Civil War.”
We have already discussed Dennis Hart Mahon and why engineering was the
primary force behind the establishment and continuation of the military
academy. Before developing
the effect on the graduates, let’s first layout what the students were
taught. West Point was
heavily influenced by the French military engineering tradition, as the
U.S. sought to model its military education on the renowned École
Polytechnique. It goes
without saying that French was required because many engineering and
military texts were in French.
The focus was on producing officers capable of designing
fortifications, bridges, roads, and other infrastructure critical to
military and national development.
Almost all of the course work in engineering and its related subjects
like chemistry took place in the second and first class years.
The capstone of the academic program was Mahan’s civil and
military engineering lectures called the science of war.
In the paper and pencil world of the 19th century much of these
studies depended on the student’s ability to draw.
It therefore should come as no surprise that there were whole
courses devoted to drawing and topography.
Technical drawing was emphasized, teaching cadets to create
precise plans and maps.
To see how this curriculum set one of our six on the path to his
downfall consider this story about George McClellan.
He was part of an elaborate team of engineers who went on an
expedition to the Pacific Northwest.
During this journey McClellan gave an early display of excessive
caution which was to mar his performance in the Civil War.
While searching for possible railroad passes through the Cascade
Range, the future commander of the Army of the Potomac failed to examine
what may have been the most suitable one at Yakima Pass in the mistaken
belief that the snow cover was much deeper than it actually was.
Historians note that Grant’s strength lay in his ability to adapt and
learn from observing engineering feats.
An example of this was what he observed in Mexico and how that
was applied in Vicksburg where he oversaw complex siege works and river
crossings. Robert E. Lee's
engineering career before the Civil War spanned military fortifications,
civil infrastructure, and wartime field engineering.
Before ending this section, we should reflect on the West Point
engineer. Many cadets
failed to grasp the practical side of military education because the men
who controlled West Point viewed its mission as being the production of
engineers who could function as soldiers rather than the other way
around.
As we begin to look at military logistics the name Mahan reappears.
As was stated earlier, his impact on the school and its students
cannot be overestimated.
Pre-Civil War logistics education included lessons on the importance of
securing resources, maintaining supply chains, and ensuring efficient
transportation of troops and materials.
The principles of military logistics were taught through a
combination of theoretical lectures and practical exercises.
As you will remember Mahan’s classes were derived from the French
with heavy emphasis on Jomini.
The Frenchman was the master of supply.
Case studies from the American Revolution and the War of 1812
illustrated the consequences of logistical failures, such as General
Burgoyne’s defeat at Saratoga due to overstretched supply lines.
Mahan’s lectures were supplemented by texts like Jomini’s
The Art of War
and Mahan’s own writings, such as
A Complete Treatise on Field Fortification.
These works included sections on logistics, emphasizing the need
for careful planning to support military operations.
Cadets were required to take detailed notes and recite lessons,
ensuring they internalized logistical principles.
As you know full well, at the beginning of the battle the
Confederates were badly undermanned.
The early morning attack looked like the forces of Irwin McDowell
would carry the day.
However, Thomas J. Jackson's Virginia Brigade moved from Winchester,
Virginia, to reinforce Beauregard.
They marched to Piedmont Station and boarded trains on the
Manassas Gap Railroad. The
brigade reached Manassas Junction just before the battle.
From there, they marched to the battlefield around noon, where
Jackson's stand on Henry House Hill earned him the nickname "Stonewall."
George McClellan’s West Point education provided him with a deep
understanding of logistics as the backbone of military success, leading
to a well-organized and supplied army.
It is easy to forget in light of his military failures on the
battlefield, that it was his genius in supply that saved the Army of the
Potomac from ruin in the early days of the war.
In the Peninsula campaign McClellan made sure that 225 tons of
supplies were on hand today, tomorrow, and on and on for the days
between mid-March and the end of July 1862.
The nation built up these supplies, wore them out, and built them
up again time after time during the war.
This is what George McClellan learned at West Point and
demonstrated in the field.
In order to introduce the cadets to the soldier’s life, practical
military skills, and to keep a closer watch on them, Sylvanus Thayer
abolished the practice of annual vacations.
In its place Thayer instituted a summer encampment during which
time the cadets lived in tents, participated in drills, and practiced
tactical movements.
The summer schedule was a busy one.
Drills began at 0530 and continued until 1700 hours.
During the day cadets took instruction in riding, dismounted
drill, infantry tactics, musketry, artillery drill and firing, and
fencing. In addition, the
boys walked guard, served on fatigue details, and of course, parading.
Moreover, the first class devoted a part of the summer to making
rockets, grenades, powder bags, and other munitions in the ordnance
laboratory.
In the fall of 1839 horses were procured and the equitation arts were
taught. Of our six only
Grant, McClellan, and Sheridan had the benefit of this training as they
graduated after the arrival of the horses.
Ulysses S. Grant’s horsemanship skills, refined at West Point
from 1839 to 1843, were a cornerstone of his military success and
personal character. One
small episode will serve to demonstrate Grant’s ability.
During his time at West Point the finest horse was York, a
chestnut-colored animal, seventeen hands high, with a strong will.
York would not tolerate an inferior rider and would through him
off, then go through the remainder of the drill alone, never making a
mistake. His favorite rider
was this young cadet from Ohio.
Once, before the Board of Visitors and a large crowd of
spectators, the riding-master had one of his dragoons hold a pole at
arms’ length above his head, the other end resting against the wall, and
signaled Grant, mounted on York, to jump it.
They cleared the pole, “coming down with a tremendous thud” in a
din of applause. The crowd
called for a repeat, and the team of Grant and York did it three more
times.
Sheridan’s Civil War career began in infantry and staff roles, but his
West Point training in cavalry tactics became critical when he was
appointed colonel of the 2nd Michigan Cavalry in 1862.
His rapid rise to command the Army of the Potomac’s Cavalry Corps
by 1864 under Ulysses S. Grant was fueled by his ability to apply and
innovate upon West Point’s cavalry principles.
His exposure to structured cavalry training gave him a
theoretical and practical understanding of mounted warfare.
Sheridan transformed Union cavalry from a scouting force into a
decisive combat arm, a shift rooted in tactical foundations but expanded
through his vision. He
integrated cavalry with infantry and artillery, using mounted troops for
shock attacks and raids, as seen in the Yellow Tavern raid in 1864,
where Confederate cavalry leader J.E.B. Stuart was defeated and mortally
wounded.
The last section of this presentation is about character, behavior, and
leadership. When Thayer
came to West Point one of the things that had shocked Thayer’s
systematic mind was the casual manner in which the cadets reported to
duty, attended classes, took examinations, and graduated.
He wanted a system whereby he could eliminate the subjective
opinions of the professors and himself in making corps recommendations
for the graduates. His
solution was the merit roll, a device which allowed Thayer to rank each
cadet within his class, so that at the end of four years he could say
that the cadet ranking first or second in his class should be an
engineer, the highest branch of the army at that time.
And, in similar manner the cadet at lowest position on the honor
role ought to be in the infantry.
This tool practically eliminated all subjective feelings, while
it took into account nearly everything a cadet did for four years, both
in and out of the classroom.
It was the most complete, and impersonal, system imaginable.
Every cadet was graded on every activity, in the classroom and on the
drill field in a positive manner and added to his class rank.
Everything else subjected the student to a black mark which
lowered his rank. In his
subjects, the cadet received marks ranging from 3.0 at the top to 0.0
for a complete failure. The
more points he had the higher he stood.
But, no manner how brilliant he was, his class rank could be
lowered if his behavior was poor.
Thayer had set up a system of demerits for each infraction of the
regulations. Academics
counted to most, but demerit could significantly lower your rank.
Each of the four years had rank for the Corps of Cadets.
Officers came from the first class, sergeants from the second,
and corporals from the third.
The school was organized as a battalion of infantry with four
companies. A cadet Captain
commanded each company, and the senior of the four student officers was
the “First Captain.” There
were many positions filled by seniors who held the rank of cadet
lieutenants. However, there
were still seniors who had “clean sleeves,” but in deference to their
status as seniors they were termed “High Privates.”
It is interesting to note that three of our six subjects, Lee,
Beauregard, and McClellan, all were cadet officers as determined by
their class rank. Grant,
Sherman, and Sheridan were all High Privates.
The merit system did not reward, in fact, it attempted to discourage,
initiative. Had the
regulations been literally and unthinkingly applied, West Point could
have only produced automatons!
That it did not was due less to the system itself than to the
more humane and broad-minded members of the staff.
They refrained from pushing the code to its limits and to the
stouthearted young men who refused to surrender their individuality
regardless of the pressure to conform.
Let’s investigate fighting as an example of bad behavior.
It was a popular pastime.
The antebellum cadet was pugnacious.
His sense of honor was prickly, and an insult or injustice almost
invariably provoked a scuffle.
Usually, the altercations were simple fist fights, resulting only
in bloody noses and black eyes.
Occasionally, the combatants resorted to weapons with intent to
do bodily harm.
Philip Sheridan was suspended for one year after a physical altercation
with a fellow cadet, William R. Terrill.
The incident began when Sheridan, offended by the tone of an
order given by Terrill, a cadet sergeant, broke ranks and threatened to
"run him through" with a bayonet.
The following day, the two engaged in a fistfight.
Sheridan's suspension was a result of this assault on an
upperclassman, which was considered a serious breach of discipline.
It is doubtful that little Phil learned to be pugnacious at West
Point, and further this “bad behavior” served him well when he received
his own command in the war.
We will now contrast Sheridan with that gentleman from Virginia.
As a cadet and superintendent, Robert E. Lee exemplified West
Point’s ideals through his discipline, integrity, and dedication to
duty. His academic
excellence, impeccable conduct, and efforts to mentor cadets set a high
standard. He was a model
cadet, graduating second in his class in 1829 with no demerits over his
four years, an extraordinary achievement reflecting discipline,
adherence to rules, and moral conduct.
His peers and instructors noted his diligence, courtesy, and
commitment to the Academy’s code of honor.
He avoided the infractions like drinking, gambling, or
insubordination, that were common among cadets.
However, his later decision to join the Confederacy raises questions
about loyalty within the framework of West Point’s values, though it
does not negate his earlier alignment with the Academy’s principles.
Lee’s legacy at West Point remains a study in both exemplary
adherence to its ideals and the complexities of applying those ideals in
a divided nation.
Grant fell short of West Point’s ideals of character, behavior, and
leadership. His
accumulation of demerits, mediocre academics, and lack of prominence in
leadership roles reflected a lack of discipline and ambition compared to
the Academy’s high standards.
Grant’s behavior was inconsistent with West Point’s ideal of
disciplined conduct. He
accumulated numerous demerits—mostly for minor infractions like
tardiness, sloppy appearance, or neglecting his quarters—finishing with
218 demerits over four years, placing him near the bottom of his class
in conduct. While he
avoided serious violations, his casual attitude toward Academy
regulations showed a lack of the meticulous discipline West Point
prized.
Drinking was an issue that dogged him all of his life.
For this his detractors have written a condemnation of the
General. That being said,
there is no definitive evidence that Ulysses S. Grant visited Benny
Havens' Tavern while he was a cadet at West Point.
The same could not be said of Sherman who was documented as a
patron of this establishment.
For decades the authorities at West Point tried to close this
“watering hole” without success.
The tavern was so popular it was eventually immortalized by the
ditty, “Benny Havens’ Oh.”
Here is the first verse and chorus:
Verse 1:
Come, fill your glasses, fellows, and stand up in a row,
To singing sentimentally, we’re going for to go;
In the Army there’s sobriety, promotion’s very slow,
So, we’ll sing our reminiscences of Benny Havens, Oh!
Chorus:
Oh! Benny Havens, Oh! Oh! Benny Havens, Oh!
We’ll sing our reminiscences of Benny Havens, Oh!
Returning to Grant he demonstrated character through his personal
integrity and a strong sense of duty during the Civil War.
He accepted the immense responsibility of leading Union forces
with unwavering commitment to preserving the Union.
His willingness to endure criticism and his lack of vanity,
evident in his simple demeanor and focus on results, aligned with West
Point’s emphasis on selfless service.
In the area of behavior, he exhibited the discipline he lacked as a
cadet. His calm under
pressure, clear decision-making, and ability to maintain composure in
chaotic battles like Shiloh, Vicksburg, and Appomattox embodied the
professional conduct West Point sought in officers.
Grant’s leadership as a general is where he most clearly fulfilled West
Point’s ideals. His
strategic brilliance, tenacity, and ability to inspire loyalty in his
troops, despite initial skepticism from superiors, made him one of
America’s greatest military leaders.
He prioritized mission success over personal glory, delegated
effectively, and adapted to modern warfare’s demands, as seen in his
innovative campaigns. His
respect for adversaries, notably in accepting Lee’s surrender at
Appomattox with magnanimity, reflected West Point’s emphasis on
honorable leadership.
Last changed: 04/02/25 |
